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Résumé / Abstract
Le but de cet article est d'étudier les propriétés dynamiques des contrats d'assurance lorsque les
assureurs détiennent une meilleure technologie de prévention des catastrophes que les assurés. Cette
technologie est permanente au sens où elle ne se déprécie pas. Si les contrats de long terme ne sont pas
possibles, les assurés font face à un problème d'engagement puisqu'ils voudraient renégocier le contrat ou
changer d'assureur après que l'assureur initial a investi le montant optimal en prévention. À cause de ce
problème de hold-up, nous montrons que l'investissement en prévention est retardé, et ce même si l'assuré
demeure avec le même assureur sur tout l'horizon de fonctionnement. Nous montrons également que la
dynamique des primes d'assurance diffère d'une suite de primes actuarielles.
This paper looks at the dynamic properties of insurance contracts when insurers have better
technology at preventing catastrophic losses than the insured. The prevention technology is owned by the
insurers and is permanent. If long-term contracts are not possible, the insured is faced with a commitment
problem since he may want to renegotiate the contract or change insurer after his initial insurer has
invested in prevention. Because of this hold-up problem, we find that the investment in prevention is
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1 Introduction
An assumption that is often implicit in the contract theory literature on prevention is that any
agents for whom prevention is valuable are aware of the best practices available. This may not
be the case, however. For example. in the case of pollution reducing technology a …rm may not
have the knowledge of the best available practices to reduce pollution (the …rm produces golf carts,
and emits in the process a toxic mercury by-product). The same rationale can also be used in
the case of high-tech data management where a …rm may not have the knowledge of the best
available practices to manage computer hacker risk (the …rm sells furniture and has all inventory
and merchandise movement computerized). The core competence of the …rm may be so di¤erent
from the competence needed to reduce risk that the …rm needs outside help to do it. There are
therefore gains to trade if prevention technology specialists sell their expertise to …rms that need
it. The question then becomes Who are the specialists?
In some instances, the insurance industry is the best provider of prevention technology, especially
if the potential loss is insured as the insurer also becomes the payer (i.e., insurance …rms absorb the
catastrophic loss when they insure the risk). Being faced with many risks of the same type in the
same industry, insurers can learn a great deal more than …rms about the most e¢cient way to reduce
risk (see Mayers and Smith, 1982, and Doherty, 1997, for similar arguments). This is especially
true for risks that are very rare, which means that only entities that deal with many possible
exposures can correctly assess the quality of the prevention technology. Put another way, insurers
have a comparative advantage in preventing catastrophes. Information technology management
provides a good example. Firms generally have no special knowledge of their exposure to computer
network and client database risk. Insurers on the other hand, given their long time presence on
the markets and exposure to catastrophic risks, have acquired technological knowledge to prevent
more e¢ciently catastrophes. Specialists working in those departments provide audits of the level
of risk, consulting on solutions, and they can also implement and service the prevention technology
for their corporate clients.1
A second important consideration for investments in prevention is that …rms need to access
the capital markets to …nance the purchase of the prevention technology. This may be impossible,
however, because of credit constraints. Constraints such as information asymmetries and imperfect
1One may also think of health insurance. Health providers (i.e., doctors) are usually better equipped to prevent
diseases than their patients.
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commitment prevent long term contracts and reduce the possibility of outside …nancing. It follows
that …rms need to …nance a large portion of the cost of the technology internally, which means
that they may not be able to invest an optimal level in prevention. Insurance companies with large
cash holdings, on the other hand, can provide …nancing to their clients. According to Caillaud,
Dionne and Jullien (2000), optimal …nancial contracts for …rms with …nancial needs and exposure
to value-reducing accident risk is a combination of a debt and an insurance contract. Financing and
insurance do not have to be provided by separate entities. Insurers have an informational advantage
to o¤er …nancing since they know the level of risk in the …rm, which other market participants can
ignore.
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between a …rm and an insurer-provider of prevention,
in a dynamic context. The …rm faces an insurable catastrophic risk in each of a …nite number of
periods. It wants to invest in prevention, but, unfortunately, it does not have the technology to
do so. Insurers on the other hand have the technology. The …rm has to hire an insurer to invest
in prevention and obtain insurance against the bankruptcy risk. Prevention investments cannot be
observed by outside insurers. Hence, an insurer does not know the risk type of the …rm unless he
has worked with it in the previous period. A …rm that wants to change insurer must make its risk
type known, which we model as entering in a round of costly auditing. For example, the …rm must
hire an outside consultant who will assess the risk type of the …rm.
Corporations that seek to manage potential catastrophic losses and/or environmental hazards
can either attempt to reduce the event’s impact on cash ‡ows or reduce the likelihood that such an
event will occur. This can be seen as an insurance problem where the insured …rms must choose an
optimal level of precaution: Insurance reduces a catastrophic event’s impact on cash ‡ows (severity)
whereas investing in prevention technology reduces an event’s frequency.
A catastrophic loss is de…ned in our model as a loss that will cause the …rm to go bankrupt. In
the separation of duties, our paper is similar to that of Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000) where
it is shown that although …rms are risk neutral, …nancing requirements make it appear as if …rms
are risk averse. The …rm needs insurance to cover bankruptcy risk. The insurer provides insurance
and prevention technology.
The problem with investing in prevention technology is that its high speci…city and complexity
makes it non veri…able by parties outside the industry. This triggers potential opportunistic be-
haviors from the part of either the insurer managing the technology or the …rm hosting it. This
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means that a …rm cannot use debt contracts to invest in prevention since its risk type is unknown
to …nanciers. On the other hand, the insurer may not want to …nance the investment since he has
no guarantee that the …rm may not claim the investment has not been done and then contract with
a competitor.
Moreover, the prevention technology is additive so that investment in prevention today reduces
the likelihood of catastrophes not only today, but also in the future. Once the investment is in
place, every other investor can bene…t from it in the future since risk is now reduced. When there is
only one period, the problem is quite trivial: The insurance contract is e¤ective for the same exact
time period as the prevention technology. This means that the insurer will invest in an optimal
level of prevention on behalf of the …rm. When more periods are involved, the insurer is faced with
the dilemma that investing in prevention reduces the risk of the …rm, but it reduces the risk of the
…rm no matter who insures the …rm in the future.2 Moreover, insurance contracts are typically
short term in nature (renegotiated every year or so) whereas investment in prevention lasts a long
time. The long-term investment bene…ts clash with short-term insurance contracts.
When investements are non-veri…able, but o¤er long-term bene…ts, insurers face a hold up
problem: What prevents the …rm from changing insurer? As is known from the literature on
transaction-cost economy (see Williamson, 1979) the solution to the hold-up problem would be to
bind both parties in a long term contract. The non veri…ability of investment, however, generates
imperfect commitment. Using a coal mining/electricity generation example Joskow (1987, 1988)
shows that the hold-up problem may not be solved using long term contracts because commitment
is imperfect and future uncertain. In this case, vertical integration can be the solution. We do
not consider this possibility here since, even if the insurer’s investment in the …rm is speci…c, the
relationship between an insurer and the …rm is not. It may be pro…table for an insurance company
to have departments specialized in several highly speci…c risk. However, transaction costs are such
that it is not pro…table for the same insurance company to purchase all its clients since it would
then have to change its activity completely.
With no binding contracts and no integration, we show that the hold-up situation results in
suboptimal investment and delays in prevention investment under simple assumptions. We also
show that in each period a …rm contracts with the same insurer who may use this informational
2 In that sense, our prevention technology has some basic characteristics of a public good because once an insurer
makes the investment, every future insurer bene…ts from it.
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advantage to charge a loading on the premium. Competition for this rent, however, drives an
insurer’s pro…t to zero in the initial period.3
We present the basic model in the following section. In section 3 we present the contract under
full commitment on the part of the …rm and the insurer. Section 4 focuses on the case where
no long-term contracts can be signed. We introduce long term relationships with renegotiation in
section 5 of the paper. It will then be clear that asymmetric information may not be the only
problem reducing precaution in a dynamic context. In section 6, we discuss some assumptions
underlying the resutls of our model to test its robustness. Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic model
Suppose N insurers4 and 1 …rm living T + 1 periods denoted t = 0 ¢ ¢ ¢T . In each period, the …rm
receives a non random revenue W . Also, the …rm faces in each period a potential catastrophic loss
L > W for which it wants to (or has to) insure. We can also view this L as including a penalty
imposed by government for environmental damages due to the …rm’s operations. The probability
of such a catastrophic loss may be reduced through investment in some prevention technology. We
denote xt the amount invested in prevention in period t and Xt =
Pt
¿=0 x¿ the accumulated amount
invested in prevention from period 0 through t. The amount invested in prevention is known to the
…rm at all time.
A loss L occurs in period t with probability ¦(Xt), whereas no loss occurs with probability
(1¡¦(Xt)). More prevention is better, which means that the probability is decreasing in the
amount of prevention: ¦0 (Xt) < 0. The probability function is convex, ¦00 (Xt) > 0, so that
the marginal decrease in the probability of loss is reduced with each additional dollar invested in
prevention. Finally, some prevention is always desirable as ¦0(0) = ¡1. We also assume that
3The standard literature on hold-up is static in the sense that the bargaining occurs only once. In our case, however,
the insurance contract is resigned every period. We innovate on Rogerson, (1992) and Gul (2001), by presenting a
hold-up problem where insurers o¤er standard insurance contracts that generate zero pro…t in expectation. This
contrasts with the …rm’s impossibility to commit in the long run to the insurance relationship, which induces the
insurer to invest only small amounts in each period. Other models on dynamic insurance have typically centered
around the repetition of adverse selection (see Cooper and Hayes, 1987, and Dionne and Doherty, 1994) and moral
hazard (see Rogerson, 1985, and Chiappori, Macho, Rey and Salanié, 1994) problems, whereas, in our case, the
information problem is dealt with through veri…cation. When commitment is impossible, however, ratchet e¤ects
arise that induce agents to delay the revelation of their true risk type (La¤ont and Tirole, 1987). The key concern
in our case is on the dynamics of prevention investments by consecutive insurers. More recently, the “Precautionary
Principle” has shed light on problems of decision under dynamic uncertainty (see Briys and Schlesinger, 1990, Gollier,
Jullien and Treich, 2000 and Immordino, 2000).
4N does not have to be large to entail competition among insurers.
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there is no depreciation in self-protection so that any amount invested in period t is still in use in
the subsequent periods.5 It is not possible to remove any part of the technology (i.e. investment is
irreversible). We can view this prevention technology as an organizational design that is costly to
implement, but that can run fully without alterations; this organizational design cannot be undone,
however.
The …rm is faced with a potential loss L which could bankrupt it. Because of bankruptcy costs,
we can view the …rm as being risk averse and thus in need of insurance.6 De…ne V (W ) as the per
period value of the …rm over …nal wealth, with V 0 (:) > 0 and V 00 (:) < 0. The intertemporal utility
of the …rm is given by
V =
TX
t=0
±t
Ã
tY
¿=0
(1¡¦(X¿ ))V (W ¡ xt)
!
;
where it is assumed that the …rm can go bankrupt in any period t with probability ¦(Xt), and
where each period is discounted at some rate ± · 1.
Since the …rm has a concave utility function each period, it wishes not only to purchase insurance
against the realization of an accident, but it also wishes to smooth its income across time. There
are therefore Pareto improving trades possible between the …rm and a risk-neutral insurer, not
only between states, but also across time. Purchasing insurance against the loss L eliminates the
possibility of bankruptcy.
The accumulated amount invested in self-protection Xt cannot be observed costlessly by out-
siders.7 Hence, potential insurers do not know the …rm’s probability of accident unless a costly
audit is performed. Auditing in period t costs a and reveals the …rm’s exact level of risk, ¦(Xt).
If an audit is conducted, the …rm’s level of risk becomes public information.
At every period t, there is an insurance contract running between the …rm and an insurer. A
contract can last one period or more, this paper examines the path of investment in prevention
under di¤erent contractual timings. The contract speci…es a contingent transfer from the …rm to
the insurer, pit, i = n; l where l denotes the loss state and n the no-loss state.
8 The contract also
5We show in part 6.2 that the introduction of a depreciation rate does not alter the result.
6See Mayers and Smith (1982), MacMinn (1987), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000)
for similar arguments. Another reason why …rms may be viewed as risk averse (and in need of insurance) is that
the managers who run the …rm are undiversi…ed, and thus need protection from adverse shocks; see Stulz (1984),
Campbell and Kracaw (1987) and DeMarzo and Du¢e (1995).
7An outsider in period t is de…ned as any player (speci…cally any insurance company) that did not transact with
the …rm in period t¡ 1.
8The investment in prevention, the insurance premium and the indemnity payment are embodied in pit.
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speci…es an amount of investment in prevention xt made prior to Nature’s move. We denote dt the
…nal wealth of the …rm in period t, dt representing the …rm’s earnings W minus any transfer made
to the insurer or as a payment for the audit.
We suppose that if an insurer remains with the …rm for more than one period, it gains proprietary
knowledge of the …rm’s level of risk. Since investment in self-protection is controlled by the insurers,
the …rm’s stock of prevention technology at the beginning of period t, Xt¡1, is known to the period
t ¡ 1 insurer. In other words at the beginning of period t, the incumbent insurer knows the
accumulated amount invested in prevention from period 0 till period t¡ 1, which means that the
incumbent insurer knows the risk type of the …rm at the beginning of period t, ¦(Xt¡1).
For the …rm to contract with another insurer at this time, it has to provide an audit report to
inform the newcomer on the level of risk. For any outside insurer to learn a …rm’s risk type an audit
must be performed. The result of the audit is public information and is disseminated prior to the
insurers making bids to insure the …rm’s risk. Although an audit makes the prevention technology
known to all insurers, only N¡1 insurers bene…t from such an information dissemination, since the
N th insurer (the incumbent) already knows this information prior to the audit being conducted.
3 Full commitment
When the …rm and the insurer can commit for the entire horizon, a long term optimal contract can
be found in period 0 that prescribes transfers for all future contingencies. Such a contract stipulates
a sequence of transfers fpnt ; pltgTt=0 and investments fxtgTt=0 that maximizes the …rm’s value over
the T periods, under the constraint that the insurer’s expected discounted payo¤ is at least equal
to zero. Since the contract provides insurance against catastrophic losses, the …rm no longer faces
states of the world in which it goes bankrupt. The problem then is:
max
fXtg;fpnt g;fpltg
TX
t=0
±t
³
(1¡¦(Xt))V (W ¡ pnt ) + ¦(Xt)V (W ¡ plt)
´
s.t. Xt ¸ Xt¡1 8 t = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢T (1)
¡X0 + (1¡¦(X0)) pn0 +¦(X0)
³
pl0 ¡ L
´
+
TX
t=1
±t
n
¡(Xt ¡Xt¡1) + (1¡¦(Xt)) pnt +¦(Xt)
³
plt ¡ L
´o
¸ 0 (2)
Note that the …rm and the insurer have the same discount factor ±.
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The set of constraints (1) prevents disinvestment in the technology, ensuring that the total
amount invested is non-decreasing. This is a set of T irreversibility constraints. The last constraint,
(2), is the insurer’s participation constraint. It ensures that the insurer receives at least an expected
payo¤ of zero over its lifetime. Note that we subtract the cost of investment in prevention from
the insurer’s payo¤. The result is independent of the writing, however, considering that the insurer
pays for the investment and charges it to the …rm through the transfers pt. By writing the problem
this way, we allow the insurer to act as a …nancier for the …rm, paying for whatever investment is
necessary and being reimbursed by the …rm through time.
Let us associate Lagrange multipliers ¸t, t = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢T to the irreversibility constraints and ¹ to
the insurer’s participation constraint. First order conditions for the problem are:
¹ = V 0(W ¡ pnt ) = V 0(W ¡ plt) for all t = 0; ¢ ¢ ¢T (3)
±T¹(1 + ¦0(XT )L) = ¸T (4)
±t¹[1¡ ± +¦0(Xt)L] = ¸t ¡ ¸t+1 for all t = 0; ¢ ¢ ¢T¡1; ¸0 = 0 (5)
Solving this system of equations yields the optimal long-term contract. The optimal contract is
described in what follows.
Proposition 1 The full commitment contract o¤ers full insurance and complete smoothing through
a constant transfer p independent of the state, an amount X¤¤ is invested in the initial period
(X0 = X¤¤) such that Ã
1 +
Ã
TX
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X¤¤)L
!
= 0
and no investment is done in the subsequent periods.
Proof : See appendix.
Full insurance and complete smoothing is implied by the set of conditions (3). Marginal utilities
are equalized through time and across states with a constant transfer p = pnt = p
l
t for all t.
The amount X¤¤ invested in period 0 equates the marginal cost of investment with its marginal
pro…tability. Since investing today helps decrease the accident probability in each subsequent
period, the marginal bene…t of precaution takes into account the decrease of the expected loss in
each future period, discounted by factor ±. Hence, the longer the horizon (the higher T ), the greater
the optimal investment X¤¤ made in period 0.
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After period 0, however, the irreversibility constraints are binding since the marginal bene…t of
investment is shrinking with the number of periods left until the end of the horizon. The …rm and
the insurer would like to sell back the technology when the weight of future pro…tability decreases.
Irreversibility constraints forbid that, which means that no investment occurs in periods 1 through
T ; i.e., xt = 0 8 t = 1; :::; T .
The full-commitment long-term insurance contract is such that the insurer bears the cost of
optimal investment X¤¤ in period 0 and spreads out evenly the reimbursement by the …rm over the
future periods, through an increase in the premium. The risk neutral insurer then o¤ers …nancing
to the …rm and makes smoothing optimal when contracts are perfect.
4 No long-term contracts
Section 3 deals with the idealistic case where there are no contract imperfections, so that a long
term contract always exist and does at least as well as a sequence of short term contracts.9 In
order to be able to …nd the dynamic insurance relationship when parties can renegotiate, we …rst
study the extreme opposite of a full commitment long term contract. Hence, we determine in this
section the equilibrium sequence of competitive contracts when the …rm cannot remain in relation
with the same insurer more than one period.
If the players do not have access to long term contracts, they may rely on a sequence of com-
petitive short-term insurance contracts. When an audit is conducted every period every insurer
becomes informed about the …rm’s risk. We suppose for now that there are no attempts from the
insurers to try and keep the contract for longer than one period.
4.1 The short-sighted …rm
First, let us concentrate on the level of precaution achieved by a myopic …rm that does not consider
the future bene…ts of precaution.10 The …rm buys insurance and precautionary investment to
maximize the per period …rm’s value subject to the insurer’s participation constraint for the period.
In each period t, the contract solves:
max
pnt ;p
l
t;Xt
[1¡¦(Xt)]V (W ¡ a¡ pnt ) + ¦(Xt)V (W ¡ a¡ plt)
9Note that in such an idealistic environment, …nancing X¤¤ is possible in period 0 through a debt contract. We
address this issue in section 6.3.
10We can view this case as letting ± = 0.
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Xt ¸ Xt¡1
¡Xt +Xt¡1 + (1¡¦(Xt)) pnt +¦(Xt)
³
plt ¡ L
´
¸ 0
The …rst order conditions for that problem entail full insurance in each period t through uncondi-
tional transfers p¤t such that V 0(W ¡a¡pnt ) = V 0(W ¡a¡plt) = V 0(W ¡a¡p¤t ). It also entails the
one-period optimal level of care X¤ such that 1 + ¦0(X¤)L = 0. Since the prevention technology
does not depreciate, there is no investment after the …rst period: Xt = Xt¡1 for t ¸ 1. Since
there is no investment after period 0, the periodic contracts are identical in each period t > 0 and
transfers p¤t are equal to the fair insurance premium: p¤ = ¦(X¤)L. However, the amount X¤ is
invested in period 0 and p¤0 = p¤ +X¤.
This has many implications. First, the …rm must be able to pay for the investment level X¤ in
the …rst period: W ¡ a ¡X¤ ¡ p¤ ¸ 0. Second, even if the …rm can pay for it, the concavity of
V implies that the …rm would like to spread the cost of investment on many periods. Moreover,
the …rm should be aware that period 0 investment in prevention brings bene…ts for more than one
period and should then want to invest an amount greater than X¤. The rational …rm should then
choose investment in care and insurance so as to maximize a lifetime utility. We describe this
problem in the next subsection.
4.2 The long-sighted …rm
A rational …rm considers its entire lifetime when solving for periodic insurance contracts and pre-
vention. The problem is then the following:
max
pnt ;p
l
t;Xt
TX
t=0
±t
n
(1¡¦(Xt))V (W ¡ a¡ pnt ) + ¦(Xt)V (W ¡ a¡ plt)
o
Xt ¸ Xt¡1 for all t
¡Xt +Xt¡1 + (1¡¦(Xt)) pnt +¦(Xt)
³
plt ¡L
´
¸ 0 for all t
The …rm chooses the sequence of contracts that maximizes its intertemporal utility over its lifetime.
Since an audit is conducted every period, the …rm is able to contract with any insurer every period,
which means that a periodic participation constraint must be included for insurers every period.
Hence, we have T + 1 participation constraints imposing that the insurer’s per period expected
payo¤ is at least zero.
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Applying multipliers ¸t, t = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢T to the T irreversibility constraints and ¹t, t = 0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; T to
the insurer’s T + 1 participation constraints we …nd the following system of …rst order conditions:
±tV 0(W ¡ a¡ pnt ) = ±tV 0(W ¡ a¡ plt) = ¹t (6)
¡ ¡1 + ¦0(Xt)L¢¹t + ¹t+1 + ¸t ¡ ¸t+1 = 0 (7)
¡ ¡1 + ¦0(XT )L¢¹T + ¸T = 0 (8)
Condition (6) implies that the …rm chooses full insurance in each period. Smoothing is not
perfect, however, since the marginal utility of earnings evolves over time with ¹t. Solving for this
system of equations allows us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the …rm must audit and sign a short term competitive insurance contract in
each period, the path of investments and transfers are such that there is a date t^ 2 f1; :::; Tg such
that
- for t < t^, a positive investment xt is made in each period (multipliers ¸t are zero), the ratio of
marginal utilities is increasing through time and always less than 1. Transfers in these periods
are pt = xt +¦(Xt)L so that the …rm’s earnings are given by dt =W ¡ a¡ xt ¡¦(Xt)L.
- In period t^, there is no investment since condition 1 +
³PT¡t^
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(Xt^¡1)L ¸ 0 holds.
- For t ¸ t^, the ratio of marginal utilities is 1 and the irreversibility constraints are binding (¸t >
0), so that no investment occurs. The …rm’s earnings are then given by dt =W ¡a¡¦(Xt^)L.
The …rm has two opposite needs. First, it must invest as soon as possible in order to decrease
the expected loss and, hence, the insurance premium to be paid in each period. The need to smooth
income delays the investment, however. The size of the delay depends on the …xed income W , the
cost of auditing a and the one-period optimal investment X¤. Hence, the irreversibility multiplier
¸ is zero for the …rst t^ periods and the irreversibility constraint becomes binding when the number
of future periods is not high enough to make a further investment valuable.
To prove this proposition, we need to present seven claims that are obtained from the …rst order
conditions. Together they lead to the characterization of the sequence of transfers and investments
obtained through a sequence of competitive contracts.
Claim 1 In each period t, the transfer is pt = Xt ¡Xt¡1 +¦(Xt)L whatever the state of nature.
That means, the …rm chooses full insurance in each period but may not achieve perfect smoothing.
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Proof : The proof of all seven claims are relegated to the appendix.
The optimal contract gives full insurance to the …rm since condition (6) implies pnt = p
l
t = pt for
all t. Let us denote dt the …rm’s income in period t in the contract, dt =W ¡ a¡ pt. Since there is
perfect competition on the insurance market, the transfer pt is equal to the fair price of insurance
plus the cost of investment: pt = Xt¡Xt¡1+¦(Xt)L so that dt =W ¡a¡¦(Xt)L¡ (Xt¡Xt¡1).
Hence, condition (6) now writes:
±tV 0(W ¡ a¡ pt) = ±tV 0(dt) = ¹t:
Claim 2 Investment in period 0 is never smaller than the one period optimal investment, that is,
X0geqX
¤.
Note that the level of precautionX¤ maximizes the …rm’s earnings in one period when the insurance
premium is fair: X¤ = argmaxXfW ¡ X ¡ ¦(X)Lg. So, the …rm wants to invest at least that
level in the …rst period. Since investment in period 0 brings bene…ts in period 1, there may be an
incentive to invest beyond X¤ in t = 0.
Claim 3 There is no investment in the last period. The …rm’s income in period T is then dT =
W ¡ a¡¦(XT¡1)L.
This, of course, results from our choice of a …nite horizon. Since the …rm no longer exists after
period T , the optimal investment level is equal to the investment in the short sighted …rm: X¤
such that 1 + ¦0(X¤)L = 0. This no-investment result depends on the fact that: 1- investment is
positive in period 0 since ¦0(0) = ¡1; and that 2- from Claim 2, the minimum investment realized
in period 0 is X¤. Hence, in period T , at least X¤ has already been invested in prevention so that
there is no need for further prevention in this last period.
Claim 4 If there is investment in the …rst period only, the amount invested is less than the full
commitment level X¤¤.
When full commitment in long term insurance contract is not possible, the insurer never invests
as much asX¤¤ in the …rst period. Thus, there is underinvestment if repeated competitive contracts
are imposed to the …rm. This is due to the fact that with a sequence of short term, competitive
contracts, the cost of investment cannot be …nanced by the …rst insurer who would spread the
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reimbursement of X0 over the T ¡1 next periods. For period 1 through T , insurance must be
priced at the expected loss on the competitive markets. Hence, the …rm has to pay for X0 in the
…rst period. Since it is concerned with the smoothing of its revenue, it would decrease the amount
invested in t = 0. The next claim shows that underinvestment in the …rst period is indeed the
consequence of investment delays.
Claim 5 If for some t < T , Xt = Xt¡1, then X¿ = Xt¡1 for all ¿ > t
Claim 5 means that if there is no investment performed in period t, then there will be none
in the future. The proof of this claim teaches us a lot about the optimal pattern of investment.
In each period, the marginal cost of investing an additional dollar in protection is compared to
the marginal bene…t of that investment (each of these amounts being, of course, weighted by the
marginal utility in the period). Although the marginal cost of investment is equal to 1 in each
period, the marginal bene…t decreases over time because the discounted sum of future expected
losses decreases as time passes whereas precaution increases.
To see why, note that in a full commitment contract, investment is done in period zero such
that the marginal bene…t of protection for the T periods to come is made equal to the marginal
cost. The condition is then
1 +
Ã
TX
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X0)L = 0:
When long term contracts are not allowed, investment is delayed because the …rm wants to smooth
its revenue and distribute the burden of the investment over many periods. However, as time passes,
the optimal amount of investment decreases since the number of future periods during which the
…rm bene…ts is reduced. Hence, given there is no further investment after period t (and given
perfect income smoothing after t), the optimal investment rule is
1 +
Ã
T¡tX
i=0
±i
!
¦0(Xt)L = 0:
It follows that as soon as the above expression is nonnegative in one period, the existing amount
of protection is su¢cient for the remaining periods, even if it may not have been for the period
before. This indicates delay in investment. Since investment only occurs in the …rst few periods,
it follows that if at some point in time investment is not pro…table, then it cannot be pro…table
afterwards.
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Claim 6 There is a period t^, 0 < t^ · T , in which no investment is made. The level of precaution
reached before this period, X^, is such that X¤ < X^ < X¤¤.
The optimal path of investments depends on the periodic comparison between marginal cost
and bene…ts of further investments as well as on the trade-o¤ between smoothing and protection.
Optimal decisions are given by the …rst order conditions (7) that can be written for all t (with
¸0 = 0): ¡
1 + ¦0(Xt)L
¢
=
±V 0(dt+1)
V 0(dt)
+
¸t ¡ ¸t+1
±tV 0(dt)
Claim 7 The smoothing obtained in the contract is represented by the ratio V 0(dt+1)=V 0(dt), which
is smaller than 1 as long as an investment is made, but increasing over time. After period t^,
V 0(dt+1)=V 0(dt) = 1.
Intuitively, since there is some investment in period 1, the irreversibility constraint does not
bind (¸1 = 0 ). When there is no further investment (after period t^), competition between insurers
imposes the same premium in each period. The …rms’s earnings are then constant after t^, implying
a ratio of marginal utilities equal to 1.
Claims 1 to 7 contribute to prove Proposition 2 and help visualize the path of investments. This
section makes clear that there is a trade o¤ between early investment and smoothing. The …rm is
better o¤ delaying investment on the …rst periods at the cost of facing a higher probability of loss
in every period thereafter. As the number of periods remaining decreases, the marginal bene…t of
investment decreases, until the marginal bene…t is zero. The level of technology at that time is
lower than the level of technology invested in period 0 when long-term contracts were possible.
5 The non-binding long term contract
In section 4 we imposed that only one-period contracts are available and that the …rm had to incur
the audit cost every period. Since audits are costly, conducting audits every period is obviously
sub-optimal. The incumbent insurer should take advantage of the information he has at the end of
period t¡1 to propose a contract that would be cheaper than conducting a costly audit in period t.
It then follows that the transfer and investment schedule described in the previous section cannot
be optimal if agents behave rationally.
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We present in this section the optimal non-binding long term contract between a …rm and its
insurer taking into account that parties can renegotiate. The …rm can still exit the relation in each
period and contract with a competitor, provided it incurs the audit cost. The incumbent insurer
can propose a better price to the …rm since audits are unnecessary when the …rm does not change
insurer. We …nd the optimal arrangement starting from the sequence of competitive short term
contracts and improving on the solution by allowing for o¤ers by the incumbent insurer in each
period. The setup is a repeated game where the incumbent insurer o¤ers a contract in each period,
taking into account the outside opportunities the …rm can …nd on competitive markets.
We approach the non-binding long term contract in two steps. First, we assume that the
schedule of investment is the same as in the previous section. This allows to show that the long-
sighted sequence of short-term contracts may be improved upon by letting the incumbent insurer
o¤er a contract so that the …rm does not want to pay for an audit. We then describe the optimal
sequence of investment in prevention.
5.1 Transfers
The solution for the optimal non-binding long term insurance relationship is not trivial. Contracts
o¤ered in each period depend on the value of the relationship in the future as well as on the
amount invested in precaution in the past. Suppose initially that the stream of investments is the
one obtained using the sequence of competitive short term contracts (Proposition 2). By allowing
the incumbent insurer to o¤er a contract before the …rm decides to enter a round of costly auditing
(i.e., make its type public), the sequence of payments is altered. This result is presented as our
third proposition.
Proposition 3 Assuming the sequence of investments is the same as for a long-sighted …rm facing
short term contracts, the solution to the repeated insurance relationship is such that insurance is
provided in every period by the same insurer. Transfers are then:
- p0 = x0 +¦(X0)L¡ ±a.
- pt = xt +¦(Xt)L+ (1¡ ±)a for all 0 < t < T .
- and pT = ¦(XT )L+ a.
Proof : See appendix.
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In the proof of Proposition 3 we show that the outcome of the sequence of short term contracts
presented in section 4 can be recursively improved. This result obtains by the observation that,
for a given schedule of investments, an insurer can make periodic positive pro…ts and still o¤er the
same lifetime utility to the …rm. Keeping the same insurer all along allows the …rm to economize
on audits since the incumbent in period t¡ 1 knows the amount of precaution at the beginning of
period t. Given that the amount saved by the …rm on an audit is a, the insurer makes a positive
pro…t each period by o¤ering a contract that is in every point the same as the one the …rm would
obtain after an audit has been performed.
Since the insurance market is competitive, every insurer in period t is willing to give the …rm a
rebate (of ±a) to receive the contract and secure a rent (of a) the next period. In the …rst period,
an initial audit has to be conducted before the …rm chooses an insurer so that the initial insurer
cannot receive rent a. Since the insurer is certain to keep the contract until period T , however, he
is willing to o¤er a rebate in period 0 equal to the discounted value of the future pro…ts he will be
able to receive as the informed insurer. It follows that the initial period’s insurer makes a zero net
expected pro…t over its entire relationship.11
Hence for the same sequence of investments, transfers are equal to those when contracts are
short-term, with the addition of a loading (1¡ ±)a. All that is left to …nd now is the optimal
sequence of investment. We have shown what the sequence of premia looks like for a given sequence
of investment. We must now show that this sequence of investment may not be the one that obtains
in the optimal relationship where the same insurer can keep the contract forever.
5.2 Investments
Since the …rm can change insurer each period, investment is delayed. We have already established
that it is not possible for an insurer to dissociate the investment in precaution from its payment by
the …rm. Optimally, the insurer would invest everything in period 0 and o¤er …nancing to the …rm
through future insurance premia. However, this is impossible since we know that, once the invest-
11To see why, note that if insurers are willing to give the …rm a rebate of ±a every period to secure a rent of a
the next period, we have that for every period from t = 0 to t = T ¡ 1, a rebate of ±a is o¤ered. At the same time
rent a is pocketed by the insurer every period from t = 1 to t = T . Given discount rate ±, we see that at t = 0 the
discounted payo¤ to the insurer is
Payo¤ = ¡ (±a)¡ ± (±a)¡ ±2 (±a)¡ :::¡ ±T¡1 (±a)
+± (a) + ±2 (a) + ±3 (a) + :::+ ±T¡1 (a) + ±T (a)
which is clearly equal to zero.
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ment is performed, any investor can propose another contract with the pro…le pt described above,
that is accepted by the …rm and leaves the …rst insurer uncompensated for its initial investment.
There is, then, delay in the investment in prevention.
However, the path of investments may not be the one observed when the …rm changes insurer
in each period. Depending on the size of income e¤ects, the sequence of investment can be di¤erent
when the …rm keeps the same insurer and then economize on audit costs compared to what obtains
when the …rm recontracts each period on the market. Indeed, the optimal smoothing rule is still
given by ¡
1 + ¦0 (Xt)L
¢
=
±V 0 (dt+1)
V 0(dt)
+
¸t ¡ ¸t+1
±tV 0(dt)
;
with dt = W ¡ (1 ¡ ±)a ¡ xt ¡ ¦(Xt)L for t = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; T¡1. Since the …rm does not have to pay
for an audit in every period, earnings are higher than in the sequence of competitive short-term
contracts. Depending on the function V , the ratio ±V
0(dt+1)
V 0(dt) may be a¤ected by the level of earnings
dt and dt+1. This income e¤ect changes the way investment is delayed from period to period.12
The sequence x0; x1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; xT that satis…es the smoothing condition may not be the one we
obtained in the previous section. However, it is still such that there is a ¹t > 1 such that xt = 0 for
all t ¸ ¹t. The possibility for the …rm to renegotiate in each period makes the insurance relationship
look much like as in a short term competitive environment. Because the …rm has the possibility to
renegotiate with other insurers, premia pt cannot be used to spread the cost of investment through
periods. The premium has to include the payment for the investment made in the period. Since the
…rm needs to smooth its earnings through time, the investment has to be delayed. The probability
of accident is then decreased slowly in time while it could be made optimal in the …rst period if the
…rm could commit in a long term relationship with the insurer.
6 Other Issues
6.1 Perfect Memory
Robustness in these results should be tested for a change in the information setting. We supposed
here that only the insurer operating the precaution technology in one period knows the level of
risk in the beginning of the next period. This is a sensible assumption since outsiders may not be
able to observe changes inside the …rm. We also implicitly assumed that an insurer forgets this
12Note that if V (d) = ¡ exp(¡rd), there is no income e¤ect and the pro…le of investments is exactly the one we
…nd with the sequence of competitive short term contracts.
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information as soon as he no longer insures the …rm, and that all the market participants forget
the outcome of the public audit after one period. Relaxing this hypothesis and supposing perfect
memory instead does not a¤ect the results: Investment is delayed and suboptimal, and follows the
same sequence as shown in Proposition 3.
The reasoning is as follows. We know that the …rm incurs the audit cost in the initial period
so as to be able to obtain insurance initially. The initial insurer then invests some amount x0
in prevention technology, an amount that is not known to outsiders. This means that outsiders,
although they recall what was the …rm’s risk initially, do not know the …rm’s risk at the beginning
of period 1. Suppose that a second round of investment is needed. If the …rm wants to change
insurer, it will need to incur the audit cost a. The incumbent insurer, knowing that the …rm can
incur the audit cost to signal its new risk characteristics, can make the audit unpro…table by o¤ering
the …rm a rebate for not incurring the cost. And given that further investment is needed, the …rm
would have to incur the audit cost a third time to signal to the market its new risk characteristics
after the two …rst rounds of investment.
Suppose on the other hand that no more investment is necessary. The …rm then knows if it were
to incur the audit cost that it would always pay a premium equal to the expected loss thereafter
since every insurer would know, and recall, that the risk characteristics of the …rm are such that no
investment in prevention is warranted anymore. This means that the …rm’s sequence of payments
until period T would be ¡a ¡ ¦(X)L, ¡¦(X)L, ...., ¡¦(X)L. On the other hand, if the
incumbent insurer keeps the same contract structure as that of Proposition 3, the …rm’s sequence
of payments until period T is ¡ (1¡ ±)a¡¦(X)L, ¡ (1¡ ±) a¡¦(X)L, ...., ¡ (1¡ ±)a¡¦(X)L,
¡a¡¦(X)L. To remain with the incumbent insurer, it then has to be that the second sequence
of payments is less expensive than the …rst. Given the discount rate of ±, it is easy to show that
the present values of the two sequences are equal. By concavity of the utility function, it follows
that the …rm prefers the second sequence of payments for any discount rate between zero and
one. Hence, relaxing the assumption on imperfect memory does not change the results stated in
Proposition 3.
6.2 Depreciation
Our prevention technology is such that any investment made in period t is fully in place in period
t+n. In other words, the prevention technology does not depreciate nor become obsolete. This may
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be a strong assumption; investments made twenty years ago in prevention technology can hardly
be perceived as pertinent today. Introducing a depreciation rate on the prevention technology,
however, would not alter our results. Suppose that prevention capital depreciates at rate (1¡ °),
so that at the beginning of period t, the level of prevention technology is °Xt¡1. With depreciation
of capital, one unit of capital today is no longer worth one unit tomorrow, but rather °. This
means that the marginal bene…t of investing in one unit of prevention is reduced. The way it is
reduced is only through a change in the discount rate: The discount rate is no longer ±, but rather
°±. The rest of the analysis is the same.
6.3 Financial Markets
Our paper assumes that …nancial markets are imperfect in the sense that the …rm cannot …nance
its investment in prevention using a standard debt contract. Obviously, if the …rm can have access
to …nancial markets and borrow funds through a standard debt contract, the delay of precaution is
not an issue anymore. If debt contracts are available, the …rm could borrow the necessary amount
to invest in an optimal level of prevention in period 0 and smooth its cost over the entire horizon.
The insurer then only needs to o¤er technical expertise as to the prevention technology and o¤er
full insurance at a fair price. This supposes, however, that long term debt contracts are available.
If that is the case, where would be the loss in generality in saying that the initial insurer (i.e., the
insurer who obtains the insurance contract in period zero after the …rst audit) purchases the entire
debt of the …rm, and then makes the optimal investment? It would not matter for the insurer that
the …rm changes insurers after period zero since it receives interest payments for the investment
in prevention over the entire life of the …rm. For our model, assuming that long-term insurance
contracts are not possible is the same as assuming that standard debt contracts are not possible.
6.4 Predatory Pricing
One …nal issue that may warrant some discussion is the fact that the audit cost is assumed by the
insured …rm. We could imagine instead that the audit (which costs a) is paid by an outside insurer
who wants to enter the bidding war for the insured’s contract. Suppose the sequence of investment
is the same as the one presented in section 4 and in Proposition 3. Suppose the incumbent insurer
charges loading a+ "T in the last period. An outsider could then o¤er the …rm to conduct an audit
(which costs the outsider a) in exchange for which the …rm signs a contract with the outsider that
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stipulates a premium load equal to a + "T2 . Clearly the …rm is better o¤ signing a contract with
the outsider since it pays a lower total premium while receiving the same bene…t.
To counter the behavior of the outsider, the incumbent insurer cannot charge a loading that
is greater than the cost for an outsider to conduct an audit (i.e., a). The incumbent is therefore
guaranteed to receive a pro…t equal to the outsider’s audit cost (a) in the last period of the game.
In period T ¡1, an outsider knows if he were to invest in an audit that he would be able to extract
a rent of a in period T . This rent is valued at ±a in period T ¡ 1. The outsider is then willing to
invest in an audit if and only if ¡a+"T¡1+±a ¸ 0, where "T¡1 is the premium loading that can be
charged in period T ¡1. The outsider will not invest in an audit in period T ¡1 if "T¡1 · (1¡ ±) a.
This means that the incumbent insurer cannot charge a loading greater than (1¡ ±)a in period
T ¡ 1 to be certain to keep the contract and pocket pro…t a in period T .
In period T ¡ 2, an outsider would be willing to invest in an audit because he knows that if he
gets the contract he would be able to pocket pro…t (1¡ ±) a in period T ¡ 1 and pro…t a in period
T . In period T ¡ 2 these future pro…ts are worth ± (1¡ ±)a+ ±2a = ±a. An investment in an audit
in period T ¡2 is then pro…table if and only if ¡a+"T¡2+ ±a ¸ 0. This means that the incumbent
insurer is still able to charge a premium load equal to (1¡ ±) a in period T ¡ 2 and still be able to
keep the contract for the next two periods while pocketing pro…ts of (1¡ ±)a in period T ¡ 1 and
a in period T .
Applying the reasoning recursively, we …nd exactly the same sequence of transfers as in Propo-
sition 3. There is therefore no loss in generality in assuming that the …rm pays for the audit instead
of an outside insurer.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown when …rms do not have access to long term contracts that investment
in prevention technology not only is delayed, but also less than the social optimum. This is true
whether we force …rms to recontract every period (after they pay for a costly audit), or whether
we let the …rm choose to renegotiate at any point in time or not. This investment path does not
have any incidence on the amount of insurance purchased in each period as the …rm is always
fully insured. This does not mean, however, that the …rm is able to perfectly smooth its income
across time. Given that only short term contracts are available, …rms end up paying each period
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for that period’s marginal investment in prevention. This is in contrast with the full commitment
case where the socially optimal level of investment is done in the initial period, and where the …rm
pays for this investment over its entire life, thus perfectly smoothing its income over time.
This result obtains for a given sequence of investments. As shown in section 3 of the paper, it
is clear that an insurer who knows that it can hold the contract on the entire horizon will want
to invest an amount X¤¤ in the …rst period. The implementability of this policy depends on the
enforceability of long-term relationships with the …rm. If the …rm can renegotiate with competitive
insurers when the investment has been paid by the initial insurer, then the initial insurer will not
invest X¤¤ in the …rst period; instead the initial insurer will delay investment until some amount
X < X¤¤ is invested.
The model we developed herein applies to the case of environmental hazard/insurance where
the government sets the penalty/clean up fee of environmental damages to L. This loss which the
…rm must bear in case of an accident is catastrophic in the sense that the …rm is better o¤ insuring
it than remaining in autarky. We did not address how the size of the penalty is chosen by the
government. We can only presume (or hope?) that the government sets the penalty e¢ciently to
cover all social costs related to environmental damages.
Another direct application is to the amount of prevention o¤ered to patients by medical providers.
If patients are able to switch from one health insurer to another, we would possibly observe a delay
in the amount of preventive medicine o¤ered by health providers. This then raises the question
of whether the US health system, where individuals may not always have the same health insurer
over their lifetime, produces socially ine¢cient health prevention incentives. On the other hand, a
health system like in Canada, France and Germany provides e¢cient long term incentive to invest
a socially optimal amount in prevention.
An aspect of the problem we did not touch is the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the
…rm in maintaining the prevention technology at its optimal level. Because the …rm is insured and
because the …rm may be the only one to know whether regular maintenance is done, the insurer
may no longer be willing to invest as much in prevention technology as before. This may delay
investment in prevention even more.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show here that x0 = X¤¤ and xt = 0 for all t ¸ 1. Using the system
of …rst order equations (3)-(5) we apply the following recursive proof.
² Suppose ¸T = 0. Then, by (4) 1 + ¦0(XT )L = 0 and XT ¸ Xt¡1, that is,
1 + ¦0(XT¡1)L · 1 + ¦0(XT )L = 0:
But (5) for t = T ¡1 implies ±T¡1¹[1¡ ±+¦0(XT¡1)] = ¸T¡1 ¸ 0 and then 1+¦0(XT¡1)L ¸ ±
. This is a contradiction.
Hence, ¸T > 0 and XT = XT¡1, that is 1 + ¦0(XT )L = 1 +¦0(XT¡1)L > 0
² Suppose ¸t+1 > 0 and ¸t = 0 for any t = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ; T¡1. Then, Xt+1 = Xt ¸ Xt¡1.
Conditions (5) on investment imply:
±t¹[1¡ ± +¦0(Xt)L] = ¡¸t+1 < 0
±t¡1¹[1¡ ± +¦0(Xt¡1)L] = ¸t¡1 ¸ 0
But this is a contradiction since ¸t = 0 implies that 1¡ ± +¦0(Xt)L ¸ 1¡ ± +¦0(Xt¡1)L.
² Since ¸t+1 > 0 implies ¸t > 0 for all t and since ¸T > 0, ¸t > 0 for all t > 0 at the solution.
This means that no investment is performed after period 0, so that Xt = X0.
² Using ¹±T (1 + ¦0(X0)L) = ¸T and ¸T¡1 = ¹±T¡1 (1¡ ± +¦0(X0)L) + ¸T , we can recursively
compute the multipliers ¸t to …nd:
¸t = ¹±
t
"
1 +
Ã
T¡tX
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X0)L
#
:
² The condition for investment in period t = 0 is ¹ (1¡ ± +¦0(X0)L) = ¡¸1. Replacing ¸1
with the preceding formula, this can be rewritten as
¹
Ã
1 +
Ã
TX
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X0)L
!
= 0 ) X0 = X¤¤:
Note that X¤¤ is the level of precaution that minimizes the cost of investment plus the
expected discounted value of potential losses.
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Proof of Claim 1. Condition (6) and usual regularity conditions on the function V imply that
pnt = p
l
t = pt. In each given period, the …rm gets the same revenue in both states of nature,
which means it is fully insured. The per period insurer’s participation constraints impose pt =
Xt ¡Xt¡1 +¦(Xt)L.
Proof of Claim 2. Let us write the …rm’s value for any given sequence of investments X =
(X0; X1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;XT ).
V(X) = V (W ¡ a¡X0 ¡¦(X0)L) + ±V (W ¡ a¡X1 +X0 ¡¦(X1)L)
+
TX
¿=2
±¿V (W ¡ a¡X¿ +X¿¡1 ¡¦(X¿ )L)
Then, a change in the …rst period investment X0 that leaves the other periods’ levels of precaution
unchanged entails a change in intertemporal value equal to
dV(X)
dX0
= ¡V 0(d0)(1 + ¦0(X0)L) + ±V 0(d1):
Having X0 · X¤ implies (1 + ¦0(X0)L) · 0 by de…nition of X¤. Hence, if X0 · X¤, then
dV(X)=dX0 ¸ 0, and the …rm’s value could be increased with X0 ¸ X¤.
Proof of Claim 3. The irreversibility constraint is always binding in the last period: ¸T > 0 so
that XT = XT¡1. This is easy to show since if ¸T = 0, then XT ¸ XT¡1 and 1+¦0(XT )L = 0. But
¸T = 0 in condition (7) for t = T¡1 implies that (1 + ¦0(XT¡1)L)¹T¡1 = ¹T +¸T¡1 > 0 and, hence,
that XT¡1 > XT , which is a contradiction. In the last period, the …rm would always like to disinvest
if this was possible. Hence, Claim 1 implies that the premium is pT = ¦(XT )L = ¦(XT¡1)L.
Proof of Claim 4. For this claim, we need to show the following corollary to claim 3.
Corollary 1 In the problem of the long-sighted …rm and the sequence of short term competitive
contracts, the Lagrange multipliers for irreversibility constraints write
¸t =
¡
1 + ¦0(Xt)L
¢
±tV 0(dt) +
TX
¿=t+1
±¿V 0(d¿ )¦0(X¿ )L:
Proof of Corollary 1. Claim 3 implies thatXT = XT¡1 and ¸T = (1 +¦0(XT¡1)L) ±TV 0(dT ) >
0 with dT = W ¡ a ¡ ¦(XT¡1)L. The condition for investment (7) in the preceding
period writes
¸T¡1 =
¡
1 + ¦0(XT¡1)L
¢
±T¡1V 0(dT¡1)¡ ±TV 0(dT ) +
¡
1 + ¦0(XT¡1)L
¢
±TV 0(dT )
=
¡
1 + ¦0(XT¡1)L
¢
±T¡1V 0(dT¡1) + ¦0(XT¡1)L±TV 0(dT )
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and then
¸T¡2 =
¡
1 + ¦0(XT¡2)L
¢
±T¡2V 0(dT¡2)+¦0(XT¡1)L±T¡1V 0(dT¡1)+¦0(XT¡1)L±TV 0(dT )
so that computing each ¸t recursively we obtain:
¸t =
¡
1 + ¦0(Xt)L
¢
±tV 0(dt) +
TX
¿=t+1
±¿V 0(d¿ )¦0(X¿ )L;
which completes the proof of the corollary.
Suppose the investment is done in the …rst period only, such that x0 = X0 > 0 and xt = 0 for
t ¸ 1. Then, Xt = X0 for all t > 0 and the …rm’s revenue is the same in each of these periods since
the competitive insurers set the premia equal to pt = ¦(X0)L for all t > 0. Since we then have
V 0(dt) = V 0(dT ) for all t > 0, Corollary 1 gives:
¸1 = ±V
0(dT )
Ã
1 +
Ã
T¡1X
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X0)L
!
The optimal condition for period 0 investment is:
V 0(d0)
¡
1 +¦0(X0)L
¢¡ ±V 0(dT ) = ¡¸1 = ¡±V 0(dT )
Ã
1 +
Ã
T¡1X
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X0)L
!
V 0(d0)
¡
1 + ¦0(X0)L
¢
+ ±V 0(dT )
Ã
T¡1X
i=0
±i
!
¦0(X0)L = 0
This can be rewritten as
V 0(d0)
¡
1 + ¦0(X0)L
¢¡ V 0(dT ) ¡1 + ¦0(X0)L¢+
(
V 0(dT )
Ã
1 +
TX
i=0
±i¦0(X0)L
!)
= 0
The full commitment level of investment would be such that the last term is equal to 0:Ã
1 +
TX
i=0
±i¦0(X¤¤)L
!
= 0;
but this would impose V 0(d0) = V 0(dT ) which is impossible since the investment X0 has to be paid
for by the …rm in period 0. Hence, V 0(d0) > V 0(dT ) and
³
1 +
PT
i=0 ±
i¦0(X0)L
´
< 0. This implies
that there is underinvestment in precaution if everything has to be invested in the …rst period.
Proof of Claim 5. This proof is made recursively.
² We know there is no investment in period T .
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² Let us suppose there is no investment in T¡1 neither and measure the welfare e¤ect of a small
increase of investment in period T¡1. If there is no investment in T¡1 the …rm’s dividend
is the same in the last two periods: dT = dT¡1 = W ¡ a¡¦(XT¡2)L. The discounted value
of the …rm for the last two periods writes:
VT¡1(XT¡2) = V (dT¡1) + ±V (dT )
A small positive dxT¡1 then entails a change dVT¡1(Xt¡2) in the …rm’s welfare:
dVT¡1(XT¡2) =
©¡V 0(dT¡1)[1 + ¦0(XT¡2)L]¡ ±V 0(dT )¦0(XT¡2)Lª dxT¡1
Hence, dVT¡1(XT¡2)=dxT¡1 > 0 at xT¡1=0 if 1+¦0(XT¡2)L+ ±¦0(XT¡2)L < 0.
² Let us suppose there is no investment in periods t through T , the …rm’s revenue then being
the same dt=dT in all these periods. A small increase of investment in period t has a positive
impact on the …rm’s utility, dVt(Xt¡1) > 0, if
1 +
T¡tX
i=0
±i¦0(Xt¡1)L < 0:
Note that if 1 +
PT¡t
i=0 ±
i¦0(Xt¡1)L ¸ 0 in one period t, then 1 +PT¡(t+¿)i=0 ±i¦0(Xt¡1)L ¸ 0
for all ¿ = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢T ¡ t. Hence, if the condition for no investment (given there is no investment
in t+1; ¢ ¢ ¢T ) holds in t, it holds in all subsequent periods (given there is no investment after
these periods). Since there is no investment in T , the condition is valid in T¡1 and then in
any preceding period and the result holds.
Proof of Claim 6. From Claim 5, if no investment is made at date t^, then no investment is
ever performed after t^. Since there is always a positive investment in t = 0, t^ > 0. Since there is
no investment performed in t = T , the …rst period with no investment made is any period t > 0.
Period t^ is such that the condition for no investment established in the preceding Claim is veri…ed
in t^ and not in t^¡ 1:
1 +
0@T¡(t^¡1)X
i=0
±i
1A¦0(Xt^¡2)L < 0 and 1 +
0@T¡t^X
i=0
±i
1A¦0(Xt^¡1)L ¸ 0
Denote X^ the minimum precaution level such that no investment is performed in t^. From
Claim 2 it has to be that X^ ¸ X0 > X¤. This level is such that 1 +
³PT¡t^
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(X^)L = 0 while
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the full commitment level is such that 1 +
³PT
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(X¤¤)L = 0. Hence,
³PT¡t^
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(X^)L =³PT
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(X¤¤)L and
³PT¡t^
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(X^)L <
³PT¡t^
i=0 ±
i
´
¦0(X¤¤)L. This implies X^ < X¤¤.
Proof of Claim 7. First order conditions for our problem write
¡
1 + ¦0(Xt)L
¢
=
±V 0(dt+1)
V 0(dt)
+
¸t ¡ ¸t+1
±tV 0(dt)
For t < t^ a positive investment is made each period so that Xt > Xt¡1 and ¸t = 0. We then have
1 >
¡
1 + ¦0(Xt)L
¢
=
±V 0(dt+1)
V 0(dt)
; t = 0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; t^¡1:
This ratio increases in time since ¦0(:) is increasing and Xt increases in time.
For t > t^, ¸t > 0: no investment is made in those periods so dt =W ¡ a¡¦(Xt^)L, 8t > t^ and
V 0(dt)=V 0(dt+1) = 1, which completes the proofs of the seven claims.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us still denote t^ as the cut-o¤ period after which no investment is
performed when there are no long term contracts. X^ = Xt^ is the amount invested in protection up
until time t^. With a sequence of short term contracts, ¦
³
X^
´
is the probability of accident for the
remaining T ¡ t^ periods. Let At represent the incumbent insurer at the start of period t.
² At the beginning of period T , insurer AT (that had the contract in T¡1) knows the …rm’s
level of risk. By accepting the incumbent insurer’s contract for period T , the …rm saves the
audit cost. Everything else being equal, the incumbent insurer can charge a above the fair
premium, that is, pT = ¦
³
X^
´
L + a and still maintain his relationship with the …rm. The
…rm is indi¤erent between this contract and the one it could obtain on the competitive market
after an audit.
² The insurer who obtains the contract in period T¡1 will be able to retain the contract in
period T , and thus secure a payo¤ of a in the end period. The market equilibrium premium,
~pT¡1,13 in T¡1 is then such that
~pT¡1 ¡¦
³
X^
´
L+ ±a = 0;
meaning that competitive insurers o¤er a rebate of ±a to get the contract. Competition in
period T¡1 then gives the …rm an intertemporal utility of
VT¡1 = V
³
W ¡ a¡¦
³
X^
´
L+ ±a
´
+ ±V
³
W ¡ a¡¦
³
X^
´
L
´
:
13We identify by the tilde (e) the market competitive premium.
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² The incumbent insurer in period T¡1, AT¡1, can o¤er a contract that allows the …rm to save
on the audit cost in T¡1. This contract must give the …rm an expected utility at least as
high as what it can get with competitors, VT¡1. The insurance premium (pT¡1) must then be
such that
V (W¡pT¡1) + ±V
³
W¡a¡¦
³
X^
´
L
´
= V
³
W¡a¡¦
³
X^
´
L+±a
´
+ ±V
³
W¡a¡¦
³
X^
´
L
´
That is, insurer AT¡1 can keep the contract until the end of the horizon with the sequence
of premia pT¡1 = a¡ ±a+¦(X^)L and pT = a+¦(X^)L. In period T¡1, AT¡1 obtains a rent
of a since the …rm does not have to perform an audit, but he has to o¤er a rebate of ±a in
order to keep the contract from competitors.
² Suppose the incumbent insurer in period t^ + 1 can keep the contract until T and secure a
sequence of transfers pt^+1; pt^+2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; pT with pt = a¡ ±a+¦(X^)L for t = t^+1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; T ¡ 1 and
PT = a + ¦(X^)L. The intertemporal utility for the …rm with such a sequence is Vt^+1. In
period t^, the competitive premium ~pt^ is such that
~pt^ ¡¦
³
X^
´
L+
T¡t¡1X
t=t^+1
±t (a¡ ±a) + ±T¡ta = 0:
We then have ~pt^ = ¦(X^)L¡ ±a; which yields utility Vt^ to the …rm equal to
Vt^ = V
³
W ¡ a¡¦
³
X^
´
L+ ±a
´
+ ±Vt^+1
² Insurer At^ will take advantage of his private information to propose a premium pt^ that gives
the …rm this exact expected utility. We thus have to …nd the pt^ that solves
V (W ¡ pt^) + ±Vt^+1 = V
³
W ¡ a¡¦
³
X^
´
L+ ±a
´
+ ±Vt^+1
This is obtained with pt^ = a¡ ±a+¦
³
X^
´
L.
Insurer At^ can continue its relationship with the …rm for every period from then on. The
total discounted payo¤ to the incumbent insurer who remains in this relationship from period
t^ onward is given by
PT¡t^¡1
t=0 ±
t (1¡ ±) a+ ±T¡t^a = a.
² In period t^¡1 an investment xt^¡1 is made for which the …rm has to pay. The insurer in period
t^¡1 would optimally invest xt^¡1 but spread the cost over the following periods. This would
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increase the …rm’s utility and allow the insurer to charge a higher premium in each period
thereafter. However, insurer At^ cannot spread the cost of investment xt^¡1 on the following
periods since competitors would then still o¤er the pro…le pt from t^ on and obtain the contract.
The investment xt^¡1 then has to be paid by the …rm in period t^¡ 1.
The competitive premium would then be such that
~pt^¡1 ¡ xt^¡1 ¡¦
³
Xt^¡2 + xt^¡1
´
L+ ±a = 0;
which gives the …rm the utility
Vt^¡1 = V
³
W ¡ a¡ xt^¡1 ¡¦
³
Xt^¡1
´
L+ ±a
´
+ ±Vt^
² The incumbent insurer At^¡1 can make sure he keeps the contract in t^¡ 1 if he performs the
investment xt^¡1 and charges a transfer pt^¡1 such that
V
³
W ¡ pt^¡1
´
+ ±Vt^ = V
³
W ¡ a¡ xt^¡1 ¡¦
³
Xt^¡1
´
L+ ±a
´
+ ±Vt^;
That is
pt^¡1 = (1¡ ±)a+ xt^¡1 +¦
³
Xt^¡1
´
L:
² Applying this reasoning recursively from t = t^¡1 to t = 1 with investment xt in each of those
periods, we …nd that the payment in period t < t^ must be
pt = ¦(Xt)L+ xt + a¡ ±a;
and the discounted payo¤ for the insurer getting the contract in t is a¡ ±a+ ±(a¡ ±a)+ ¢ ¢ ¢+
±T¡t¡1(a¡ ±a) + ±T¡ta = a
² In period 0, an audit must be conducted since there is no incumbent insurer with the infor-
mation on the …rm’s risk. Insurer, then, cannot charge a and demand no audit. Since the
insurer that receives the contract in t = 0 can remain in relation with the …rm until t = T and
secure a payo¤ valued ±a in period 0, competition pushes all investors to propose a rebate of
±a in period 0. The transfer in t = 0 is then
p0 = x0 +¦(X0)L¡ ±a;
and the discounted total payo¤ from the contract for the insurer is 0.
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